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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Ninth Amendment to the United States Constitution declares that 
“[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”  Despite 
decades of scholarship about judicial enforcement of these other rights, 
courts have disregarded the amendment with impressive consistency.  
Another stream of scholarship has promoted constitutional interpretation 
outside the courts.  These ideas have had some real-world support, most 
 
 *  Professor of Law and Harold Norris Faculty Scholar, Michigan State University College of 
Law.  Special thanks to Reb Brownell, Rick Garnett, Michael Gerhardt, Mark Graber, Mae 
Kuykendall, Kurt Lash, Lumen Mulligan, Christopher Schmidt, Glen Staszewski, Maxwell Stearns, 
Mark Tushnet, Jen Verleger, Robin West, and the participants at workshops at the University of 
Maryland Carey School of Law and the Michigan State University College of Law, for their 
suggestions. 
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recently from the Tea Party,1 but they have also been met with bafflement.2 
In this article, I explore the intersection of these two undervalued lines 
of inquiry, and I find more there than just doubled disappointment.  I 
contend that the Ninth Amendment has a lot to say to Congress, and that 
Congress in turn is well-suited to vindicate the Ninth Amendment’s “other” 
rights. 
Currently, if (as the “interpretation outside the courts” movement would 
have it) members of Congress consider the Constitution before passing a 
law, it is to make sure that something in the Constitution empowers them to 
pass the law, or that nothing in the Constitution forbids it.3  But the Ninth 
Amendment tells them that they should be asking more. 
The first eight amendments are a list of rights that Congress must 
respect, and the Ninth Amendment adds an “et cetera” to the end of that list.4  
The Ninth Amendment directs Congress not to use the Bill of Rights as a 
checklist, going through the rights specifically enumerated in the 
Constitution (“First Amendment?  No problem.  Second Amendment?  No 
problem. . . .”) and concluding once the list has been cleared that a proposed 
law is okay.  Instead, Congress must consider other, unlisted rights too.  Put 
another way, the Ninth Amendment tells us that Congress is wrong when it 
acts as though it is permitted to do everything that is not specifically 
forbidden.5 
 
 1.  See generally Christopher W. Schmidt, The Tea Party and the Constitution, 39 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 193 (2011) (discussing Tea Party’s use of popular constitutionalism). 
 2.  Consider this example of bafflement: 
At a press conference held by House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, a reporter . . . asked the 
Speaker where in the Constitution she found the basis for the individual mandate 
provision of the health care bill. . . .  “Are you serious?  Are you serious?” she asked.  
When the reporter responded in the affirmative, [she] shook her head and moved on to 
another questioner. 
Schmidt, supra note 1, at 233–34 (noting Pelosi’s comment as an inspiration to the Tea Party 
initiative); see also Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator’s Guide to Constitutional 
Interpretation, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585, 587 (1975) (noting that despite seeming self-evident, “many 
legislators” reject the idea that members of Congress should consider the constitutionality of 
legislation before voting).  Opposition to the Tea Party’s initiative is partly just partisan, but this is 
somewhat ironic given that the leading scholars in the “interpretation outside the courts” movement 
are mostly quite far from conservative themselves.  See Christopher W. Schmidt, Popular 
Constitutionalism on the Right: Lessons From the Tea Party, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 523, 545 (2011) 
(characterizing political leanings of popular constitutionalists in the academy). 
 3.  Because courts generally ask those same two questions, members of Congress often ignore 
the Constitution and focus instead on policy.  See infra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 4.  DANIEL A. FARBER, RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE “SILENT” NINTH AMENDMENT AND 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AMERICANS DON’T KNOW THEY HAVE 4 (2007) (describing the 
Ninth Amendment as adding “a crucial ‘etc.’ to the Bill [of Rights]”). 
 5.  This renders the Ninth Amendment somewhat redundant with the Tenth Amendment.  
Commentators differ on what that redundancy means for this interpretation of the Ninth 
Amendment.  See Lawrence G. Sager, You Can Raise the First, Hide Behind the Fourth, and Plead 
the Fifth.  But What on Earth Can You Do with the Ninth Amendment?, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 239, 
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Of course, saying that Congress should consider other rights tells us 
nothing about what the other rights are.  Rather, it suggests a process for 
finding and vindicating these other rights in Congress.  This process can 
potentially clarify our concept of what “rights” are, and can enrich political 
debates accordingly.  It can also explain, in a new way, things that Congress 
has been doing all along. 
The central point, though, is simply this: There are important rights that 
are not in the Constitution, and the Ninth Amendment tells us to respect 
them.  That “us” includes Congress.  Congress should act to vindicate these 
valuable rights. 
Part II of this article briefly discusses current thinking about the Ninth 
Amendment and about constitutional interpretation outside the courts.  The 
current literature has focused on the Ninth Amendment in the courts, and on 
the rest of the Constitution in Congress.  Others have thus danced around the 
subject of this article, and have occasionally touched upon it, but this article 
is the first to give full consideration to the Ninth Amendment in Congress. 
Part III explores some of the possibilities that the Ninth Amendment 
opens up for Congress.  The simplest is the expansion of traditional negative 
rights.  However, it can also promote other forms of rights, including so-
called positive rights.  Indeed, Congress already creates such rights; the 
Ninth Amendment can make that process more conscious, in ways that 
better serve the rights in question. 
Part IV answers three likely criticisms of Part III.  The first and most 
important criticism is that these “rights” are really no more than politically 
popular ideas.  Another is that Congress is not capable of performing this 
deliberative task.  A third is that this theory offers inadequate protection for 
these rights. 
II.  CONTEXT 
In a 2000 book review, I wrote the following in a footnote to a 
discussion of the Ninth Amendment: “I am in the process of writing an 
account of the Ninth Amendment that emphasizes . . . political means of 
defining and enforcing rights, and promotes their revitalization today.”6 
There was a lot of good scholarship about the Ninth Amendment and 
 
245–51 (1988) (discussing support for and criticism of this interpretation). 
 6.  Brian C. Kalt, The People’s Forest and Levy’s Trees: Popular Sovereignty and the Origins 
of the Bill of Rights, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 119, 133 n.22 (2000) (book review).  At that time, I was 
skeptical of courts interpreting the Ninth Amendment.  In this article, I take no position on the 
question. 
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about constitutional interpretation outside the courts at that time, and much 
more has emerged since then.  Insights from that scholarship will pepper 
Parts II and III and their footnotes.  The focus in this part is on why, despite 
all of this scholarship, there is still plenty of room for an article considering 
the Ninth Amendment in Congress. 
A.  The Ninth Amendment 
The literature on the Ninth Amendment and unenumerated rights, both 
from before 20007 and since then,8 has focused primarily on whether and 
how courts should use the Ninth Amendment.  The answers diverge.  Some 
work promotes the use of the Ninth Amendment in court; other work decries 
the possibility.  Scholars answer variously that the Ninth Amendment’s 
“other” rights are those derived from natural law or from federalism (that is, 
the amendment limits the federal government’s power to violate state-
established rights).9 
This article is different.  It takes no position on what courts can or 
should do with the Ninth Amendment, and so it sidesteps almost all of the 
extant literature.  Instead, this article focuses only on what Congress can do 
with the Ninth Amendment.  As for the content of unenumerated rights in 
Congress, the whole point is that this is a matter for Congress to determine. 
B.  Interpretation Outside the Courts 
The literature on interpretation outside the courts is more extensive than 
the literature on the Ninth Amendment.  It represents a reaction to the 
 
 7.  See, e.g., MARSHALL DEROSA, THE NINTH AMENDMENT AND THE POLITICS OF CREATIVE 
JURISPRUDENCE (1996); CALVIN R. MASSEY, SILENT RIGHTS: THE NINTH AMENDMENT AND THE 
CONSTITUTION’S UNENUMERATED RIGHTS (1995); 1 THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE 
HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989) (collecting 
scholarship by numerous authors); 2 id. (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1993) (same). 
 8.  See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY (2004) [hereinafter BARNETT, LOST CONSTITUTION]; FARBER, supra note 4; KURT T. 
LASH, THE LOST HISTORY OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT (2009); Randy E. Barnett, Who’s Afraid of 
Unenumerated Rights?, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1 (2006) [hereinafter Barnett, Unenumerated Rights]; 
Mark A. Graber, Enumeration and Other Constitutional Strategies for Protecting Rights: The View 
From 1787/1791, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 357 (2006); Ken I. Kersch, Everything Is Enumerated: The 
Developmental Past and Future of an Interpretive Problem, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 957 (2006); Frank 
I. Michelman, Unenumerated Rights Under Popular Constitutionalism, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 121 
(2006); Louis Michael Seidman, Our Unsettled Ninth Amendment: An Essay on Unenumerated 
Rights and the Impossibility of Textualism, 98 CAL L. REV. 2129 (2010); Mark Tushnet, Can You 
Watch Unenumerated Rights Drift?, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 209 (2006); Ryan C. Williams, The Ninth 
Amendment as a Rule of Construction, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 498 (2011).  Williams includes a 
particularly useful summary of the history of the Ninth Amendment in court and in the academy.  
See id. at 504–08. 
 9.  Among the numerous explanations of these two different approaches, a particularly helpful 
one is that in MASSEY, supra note 7, which finds both to be justified by original intent. 
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twentieth century trend toward judicial supremacy, and it reasserts the role 
of other participants in the enterprise of constitutional interpretation.10 
Some of this scholarship focuses on constitutional interpretation by the 
public,11 some focuses on interpretation by Congress or the President,12 and 
some considers all of this.13  Together, this work reinforces a notion that is 
very important here: that the American political system is capable of 
conducting high-minded discussions of abstract principles and higher law, 
not just down-and-dirty fights about policy and power. 
For the most part, though, this literature does not engage the Ninth 
Amendment.  These scholars focus on constitutional interpretation, after all, 
and by definition unenumerated rights are not listed in the Constitution.  To 
be sure, the Ninth Amendment itself is part of the Constitution, but this 
article is not about interpreting the Ninth Amendment as such; it is about 
respecting and applying the Ninth Amendment in Congress.14 
 
 10.  See Robert A. Schapiro, Judicial Deference and Interpretive Coordinacy in State and 
Federal Constitutional Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 656, 657–58 (2000) (describing academic 
consensus that non-judicial branches have a power/duty to interpret the Constitution, 
notwithstanding courts’ notions of judicial supremacy). 
 11.  See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); WAYNE D. MOORE, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND POWERS OF THE 
PEOPLE (1996); Doni Gewirtzman, Glory Days: Popular Constitutionalism, Nostalgia, and the True 
Nature of Constitutional Culture, 93 GEO. L.J. 897 (2005). 
 12.  See, e.g., CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION (Neal Devins & Keith E. Whittington eds., 
2005) [hereinafter DEVINS & WHITTINGTON] (collecting scholarship by numerous authors); DAVID 
P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789–1801 (1997) 
[hereinafter CURRIE, FEDERALIST PERIOD]; DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: 
DESCENT INTO THE MAELSTROM, 1829–1861 (2005); NEAL DEVINS, SHAPING CONSTITUTIONAL 
VALUES: ELECTED GOVERNMENT, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE ABORTION DEBATE (1996); 
STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (1996); DONALD G. MORGAN, CONGRESS 
AND THE CONSTITUTION (1966); J. MITCHELL PICKERILL, CONSTITUTIONAL DELIBERATION IN 
CONGRESS (2004); LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES (2004); KEITH E. 
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
MEANING (1999); Paul Brest, Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker and Its Power to Counter 
Judicial Doctrine, 21 GA. L. REV. 57 (1986); Brest, supra note 2; Louis Fisher, Constitutional 
Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63 N.C. L. REV. 707 (1985); Michael J. Gerhardt, Non-
Judicial Precedent, 61 VAND. L. REV. 713 (2008); Neal Kumar Katyal, Legislative Constitutional 
Interpretation, 50 DUKE L.J. 1335 (2001); Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive 
Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267 (1996); Abner J. Mikva, How Well 
Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61 N.C. L. REV. 587 (1983); Todd E. Pettys, 
Popular Constitutionalism and Relaxing the Dead Hand: Can the People be Trusted?, 86 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 313 (2008); Schmidt, supra note 1; Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional 
Interpretation: Three Objections and Responses, 80 N.C. L. REV. 773 (2002). 
 13.  See, e.g., JOHN J. DINAN, KEEPING THE PEOPLE’S LIBERTIES: LEGISLATORS, CITIZENS, AND 
JUDGES AS GUARDIANS OF RIGHTS (1998); MOORE supra note 11; MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE 
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999). 
 14.  Some scholars have focused on the American constitution with a lowercase “c”: the 
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C.  At the Intersection 
Not much has been written in depth at the intersection of these two lines 
of inquiry.  The most common items are passing references in which 
Congress is used as a foil for the courts.  Those who want courts to enforce 
Ninth Amendment rights sometimes offer Congress as a bogeyman, 
essentially saying, “Some people reject the idea of judges protecting 
unenumerated rights.  They would place these important rights at the mercy 
of those craven chuckleheads in Congress.”15  On the other side, those who 
reject a judicial Ninth Amendment role agree that they would leave 
unenumerated rights at the mercy of Congress, and they are untroubled by 
that result, but they are not moved to actually promote it.16  Both sides seem 
to concede that Congress can do something with unenumerated rights along 
the lines of what this article suggests—presumably something very different 
from what courts can do with them—but neither side really considers the 
details of what Congress can do with them.17 
 
structures and principles that govern how the nation is run.  Not all of that constitution appears in the 
Constitution with a capital “C”: the 1787 document and its amendments.  This scholarship is thus 
distinct from the larger body of work on constitutional interpretation as such, but it will be important 
here.  See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES 26 (2010) 
(noting lack of attention paid to small-c constitutional tasks being completed outside courts); see 
also Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408, 418 (2007). 
 15.  Among many others, see FARBER, supra note 4, at 4–5 (decrying conservatives who 
“contend that these unenumerated rights lack any legal weight and were merely entrusted to the 
political process”) (emphasis added); see also BARNETT, LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 8, at 255 
(arguing that without judicial enforcement of unenumerated rights, Congress and the President could 
“violate [them] with impunity”); Sager, supra note 5, at 251–52 (discussing and rejecting “judicial 
unenforceability thesis,” but in a way that is less critical of Congress).  Perhaps the most surprising 
example of such glancing blows appears in MASSEY, supra note 7.  Massey offers a deep, nuanced, 
historical-philosophical investigation of the proper judicial interpretation of the Ninth Amendment.  
See id. at 190–93.  He even discusses the ways that Congress can interact with the courts when the 
courts weigh in on the amendment.  See id. at 203–06.  As to Congress’s independent consideration 
of the amendment, though, he offers nothing much beyond what the others mentioned in this 
footnote do, even after hinting that there is some “there” there.  For instance, he notes that members 
of Congress “are required to determine the scope of [Ninth Amendment] rights and to act to preserve 
and obey them,” and he concedes that “it cannot be assumed” that “unenumerated rights will wither 
and die” in Congress.  Id. at 14.  He nevertheless continues much as though he is making precisely 
that assumption.  See, e.g., id. at 203–06.  Massey also provides a wonderful account of James 
Madison’s invocation of the Ninth Amendment in a congressional debate over the Bank of the 
United States, but without taking this as a cue to engage the larger issue of the amendment’s use in 
Congress.  See id. at 81–82. 
 16.  See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 91–92 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (finding Ninth 
Amendment right to control the upbringing of one’s children, but limiting enforcement of this to 
arguments in “legislative chambers or in electoral campaigns”); cf. Raoul Berger, The Ninth 
Amendment: The Beckoning Mirage, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 951, 962 (1990) (“I would not deny effect 
to the unenumerated rights of the ninth amendment, but only insist that it is for the people [as 
distinct from Congress], not the judiciary, to clothe them with actuality.”). 
 17.  For explanations about why this may be, see MOORE, supra note 11, at 4 (“Excessive 
preoccupation with the roles of judges within the constitutional system has distorted analysis of 
actions taken and options available to other governmental officials and to citizens.”); Robin West, 
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Some scholars have done more to promote Congress’s independent 
consideration of the Ninth Amendment, but they have done so mainly in 
passing.  As an example, Andrzej Rapaczynski has written that Ninth 
Amendment rights might include “more amorphous traditions,” such that 
“[s]ome of them, even though quite important, could have been conceived as 
less than unchangeable—perhaps the people themselves, acting through their 
representatives in the legislature, could renounce or revoke them.”18  
Rapaczynski continues by noting that at the time it was written, the Bill of 
Rights was understood not just as a legal document but also as a statement of 
political norms, with the Ninth Amendment as an important open end to that 
statement.19  That is pretty much all he has to say about it, though. 
Robin West has gone further.  She has written eloquently about what she 
calls “unenumerated duties”: affirmative obligations of governments to act 
that are not specified in the Constitution, and which are not necessarily 
enforceable in court.20  West contends that legislators are compelled to act 
not only by moral or political imperatives but also by the Constitution itself; 
the Constitution, she says, requires more from legislators than just those 
things that courts might order.21  In all of this discussion, though, West never 
mentions the Ninth Amendment—perhaps because she is focusing on duties 
rather than rights.22 
The venerable Charles Black mentioned the Ninth Amendment in 
Congress in an article about the positive right to livelihood.23  As he put it, 
“The courts probably cannot do very much [with the Ninth Amendment right 
 
Unenumerated Duties, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 221, 228 (2006) (noting that scholars’ discussion of 
affirmative legislative duties “are typically made within the context of an argument whose main 
point is to take the judiciary off the hook of constitutional or moral responsibility rather than put the 
legislature on it”). 
  That courts and Congress would use different tools to handle the same constitutional 
provision should not be surprising.  See Whittington, Extrajudicial Interpretation, supra note 12, at 
813–14 (noting different competencies and techniques of courts compared to Congress). 
 18.  Andrzej Rapaczynski, The Ninth Amendment and the Unwritten Constitution: The Problems 
of Constitutional Interpretation, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 177, 182 (1988); see also Sotirios A. Barber, 
The Ninth Amendment: Inkblot or Another Hard Nut to Crack?, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 67, 86 (1988) 
(favoring a “multiplicity of interpreters” of the Ninth Amendment). 
 19.  See Rapaczynski, supra note 18, at 182–88. 
 20.  West, supra note 17. 
 21.  See, e.g., id. at 235 (“My conclusion that the Constitution imposes no judicially enforceable 
legal duties on legislators does not imply that it imposes no political, constitutional, or moral duties 
on legislators that might be interpreted by representative bodies and enforced by the people through 
the ballot box.”). 
 22.  See id. at 225 (discussing distinction between rights and duties). 
 23.  See Charles L. Black, Jr., Further Reflections on the Constitutional Justice of Livelihood, 86 
COLUM. L. REV. 1103 (1986). 
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to livelihood] . . . .  But Congress too is bound by the Constitution . . . .”24  
His conclusion was that “a constitutional justice of livelihood should be 
recognized, and should be felt by the President and Congress as laying upon 
them serious constitutional duty.”25  But Black’s principal point was to argue 
just that the right to livelihood existed; he had no real detail to offer about 
how this Ninth Amendment right would actually work inside Congress.26 
In a sense, then, the point of this article is to go back to my twelve year 
old footnote, combine it with thoughts like Rapaczynski’s, West’s, and 
Black’s, and run with them. 
III.  THE NINTH AMENDMENT IN CONGRESS 
Part I summarized the effects that the Ninth Amendment should have in 
Congress: reminding Congress that it should not act as though everything is 
permitted that is not specifically forbidden, and thus that Congress should 
consider unenumerated rights before it passes laws. 
This part will explore what this would look like in practice, first as to 
traditional negative rights, then as to positive and other sorts of rights.  It 
concludes by bringing a Ninth Amendment perspective to others’ research 
about how Congress already establishes rights that are not listed in the 
Constitution—to show, in other words, that Congress is already doing what 
this article suggests, just not consciously. 
A.  Negative Rights 
Negative rights—rights to be free from particular government action or 
interference—are the most obvious sort of Ninth Amendment rights.27  The 
Bill of Rights appears as a list of such negative rights, and the “et cetera” 
that the Ninth Amendment adds at the end suggests that the Ninth 
Amendment’s “other” rights are of the same ilk.28  This article maintains that 
the Ninth Amendment can encompass other sorts of rights as well,29 but 
negative rights are a logical place to start. 
The fact that the negative-rights version of the Ninth Amendment is the 
most obvious might explain why we have not seen more use of the Ninth 
Amendment in Congress.  We live in a post-New Deal, post-Great Society 
era of activist government.  Libertarianism is a significant ideology, but it is 
 
 24.  Id. at 1107. 
 25.  Id. at 1113. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  See West, supra note 17, at 241–42 (discussing centrality of negative rights in American 
lawyers’ jurisprudential worldview). 
 28.  See U.S. CONST. amends. I–IX. 
 29.  See infra Part III.B. 
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far from a dominant one in the U.S.30 
That said, the Ninth Amendment offers negative-rights fodder for both 
liberals and conservatives, and not just libertarians.31  As Leif Wenar and 
Stephen Macedo have put it:  
Americans reach for the language of rights to support political 
reforms at all points along the political spectrum, and they do so 
from a wide range of perspectives, from the religious to the 
militantly secular.  The language of rights in America has never 
been the language of a single group or movement.32 
So, for instance, Congress could act with an understanding that women 
have a right to choose abortion—thereby defeating proposed restrictions on 
abortions—or, alternatively, that the unborn have a right to life—thereby 
defeating proposed funding for abortions—and it would not matter whether 
or not these rights could be found anywhere in the Constitution.  The Left 
can press for anti-discrimination rights for gays and lesbians, and the Right 
can press for the right to individual treatment as opposed to category-based 
affirmative action—again, without having to find these rights in the 
Constitution.  The list is potentially endless. 
To illustrate the Ninth Amendment’s effect in Congress more directly, 
consider a hypothetical proposal for an internet-surveillance law.  Assume 
that it is well-designed as a matter of policy (it would successfully address a 
real problem), that nobody doubts the law is within Congress’s power to 
enact (under the Commerce Clause, let’s say), and that the Supreme Court 
will have no problem affirming the statute if it passes, because the case law 
makes clear that the statute would not be held to violate Fourth Amendment 
rights against unreasonable searches. 
Even before we get to the Ninth Amendment, Congress could have 
some constitutional debate here.  Following the “interpretation outside the 
 
 30.  See David Boaz, How Many Libertarian Voters Are There?, CATO@LIBERTY (Jan. 22, 2010, 
3:15 PM), http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/how-many-libertarian-voters-are-there/ (estimating that 
14% of registered voters are libertarians). 
 31.  Cf. FARBER, supra note 4, at 3 (describing failure of liberals to make use of Ninth 
Amendment); Schmidt, supra note 1 (contending that popular constitutionalism naturally favors 
conservative or libertarian ideas). 
 32.  Leif Wenar & Stephen Macedo, The Diversity of Rights in Contemporary Thought, in THE 
NATURE OF RIGHTS AT THE AMERICAN FOUNDING AND BEYOND 280, 293 (Barry Alan Shain ed., 
2007); cf. ALAN DERSHOWITZ, RIGHTS FROM WRONGS 166–68 (2004) (listing rights, each with an 
opposite, conflicting right); Tushnet, supra note 8, at 211–12 (listing unenumerated rights 
recognized by courts and noting that they have been “used in the service of conservative as well as 
liberal goals”). 
KALT W.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/10/2013  12:59 PM 
 
84 
courts” line of thinking, a representative might object that the Supreme 
Court’s precedents give short shrift to the true meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.  As a result, the representative would call on Congress to reject 
the bill on Fourth Amendment grounds, regardless of the fact that the courts 
would uphold the law.  This debate will be hard for our objector to win, 
though.  Some members will agree with her assessment of the Fourth 
Amendment.  Others will disagree.  The vast majority, however, will huddle 
together under the “judicial overhang”—they will be content to avoid the 
entire constitutional discussion and just rely on the courts to interpret the 
Fourth Amendment.33  The number of members who both think that the 
proposed law would be effective policy-wise, and are not worried about the 
Fourth Amendment, should be enough for the law to pass. 
Now add in the Ninth Amendment.  With it, Congress cannot be 
satisfied just to ask whether there is a Fourth Amendment problem, and, if 
there is not, assume that it has the power to act.  Instead, Congress must ask 
whether there are any other rights threatened by the proposed law.  Instead 
of a short list of barriers to federal action, there is now a potentially infinite 
one.  Maybe the new law would violate an enhanced right to internet privacy 
that goes beyond anything arguably in the Constitution, but which is 
nevertheless compelling.  If enough members of Congress turn against the 
bill when they are confronted with this internet-privacy rights argument, the 
bill will fail. 
Even if most members reject the internet-privacy rights argument, there 
would at least be a debate as members moved out from underneath the 
judicial overhang.  It would be a non sequitur for anyone to claim that the 
internet-privacy argument should just be left to the courts to sort out, or that 
Congress should consider the argument but only in line with judicial 
precedents.  By definition, the rights at issue here are unenumerated, so the 
courts will not have weighed in on them.34  Moreover, because this is about 
negative rights—what Congress cannot do—the successful assertion of a 
right would manifest itself with a law not being passed.  Unless Congress’s 
inaction results in some unconstitutional inequality or lack of due process, 
 
 33.  TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 57–58 (discussing judicial overhang); see also MORGAN, supra 
note 12, at 248–49 (offering example from 1940s wiretap debate); PICKERILL, supra note 12, at 7–8 
(discussing congressional deference to judicial decisions); id. at 70–82 (describing how Congress 
stopped deliberating about the commerce clause after a generation of courts’ broad interpretation and 
consistent deference to Congress); Christopher W. Schmidt, The Sit-Ins and the State Action 
Doctrine, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 767, 820–23 (2010) (discussing effect of judicial overhang 
on congressional consideration of Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
 34.  If the courts had recognized the right being debated, they would not have treated it as 
unenumerated, but rather as included in substantive due process, enumerated in the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.  See Tushnet, supra note 8, at 212–13 (noting that courts always 
enumerate newly recognized unenumerated rights by tying them to something in the Constitution). 
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there generally will be nothing on the books for the courts to overrule here.35  
Again, it would make no sense for members of Congress to try to sidestep 
the internet-privacy rights debate by deferring to the courts. 
A broader, Ninth Amendment-inspired debate would help in other ways.  
It would be good, for instance, for individual representatives and senators to 
have to state on the record where they stand about a particular right.  This 
would enrich the public debate and provide valuable information to voters 
and interest groups, who could add further fuel to the fire and add more 
public democratic accountability to the process—if they weren’t the ones 
who pushed Congress to debate this new right in the first place.36  Something 
much like this happened in the recent robust public debate over the Stop 
Internet Piracy Act (SOPA).  The opponents’ argument was not just that the 
proposed law was bad policy, it was that it crossed a line.37  Opponents did 
not speak in terms of the Ninth Amendment directly, but they could have; 
many asserted rights beyond that which the Constitution might require or the 
courts might enforce.38 
Such negative-rights offensives have a venerable pedigree.  In the early 
decades of the Republic—when not only the Ninth Amendment but the 
intellectual foundations on which it rested were more widely 
acknowledged—this sort of congressional consideration and self-restraint 
were important mechanisms for protecting rights.39  The Bill of Rights made 
 
 35.  Courts could find that, in certain circumstances, the Constitution requires Congress to take 
certain actions, but this is exceedingly rare.  See West, supra note 17, at 230–31 (recognizing but 
criticizing this fact). 
 36.  See MOORE, supra note 11, at 41 (discussing how popular movements can “create[] 
unofficial legal meanings” that go on to influence Congress and the courts); PICKERILL, supra note 
12, at 139, 143 (citing examples, from natural-resources and gun-control contexts, of interest groups 
spurring deeper and less court-centered discussions of rights in Congress); Schmidt, supra note 1 
(discussing Tea Party’s methods of popular constitutional mobilization).  But see Gewirtzman, supra 
note 11 (expressing pessimism about general public’s capacity to participate meaningfully in 
constitutional debates).  See generally KRAMER, supra note 11 (promoting “popular control over the 
course of constitutional law”). 
 37.  See, e.g., SOPA STRIKE, http://sopastrike.com (last visited Oct. 2, 2012) (“We need to kill the 
bill—PIPA in the Senate and SOPA in the House—to protect our rights to free speech, privacy, and 
prosperity.”) (emphasis added). 
 38. Id. 
 39.  See DINAN, supra note 13, at xi (arguing that up through the nineteenth century, “rights were 
secured primarily through representative institutions and the political process, particularly through 
the passage of legislative statutes”); Graber, supra note 8, at 363–79 (giving full account of original 
intent and early practice of securing rights through proper congressional structure rather than 
through enumeration); cf. Daniel J. Elazar, How Present Conceptions of Human Rights Shape the 
Protection of Rights in the United States, in OLD RIGHTS AND NEW 38, 43 (Robert A. Licht ed., 
1993) (discussing how in the early Republic, “[l]egislatures did more for the protection of rights than 
courts”). 
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precious few appearances in the Supreme Court in the Republic’s first 
century, but the Bill’s principles loomed large in the political sphere.40 
An early, powerful example is the Sedition Act.41  The Jeffersonian 
opposition objected in Congress and in court to the Act’s suppression of free 
speech, but to no avail.42  Federalist legislators and judges did not interpret 
freedom of speech that way.43  When the Jeffersonians took over the 
government in 1801, they implemented their constitutional vision: President 
Jefferson pardoned the Sedition Act convicts, and Jefferson’s partisans in 
Congress let the law expire.44  It would be over 160 years before the courts 
would actually disavow the constitutionality of the Sedition Act in a First 
Amendment case.45  In the meantime, though, members of Congress were 
free to take a different constitutional view—whether by interpreting the First 
Amendment right to free speech more broadly, or by taking a Ninth (and 
Tenth) Amendment approach to read federal power more restrictively than 
anything in the Bill of Rights explicitly required.46  It was not controversial 
for Congress to feel compelled to stop short of doing anything and 
everything that the courts allowed it to do; neither should it be controversial 
today. 
For another example (among others) that implicates the Ninth 
Amendment more directly, consider an early debate over a bill that would 
have limited electioneering by federal revenue officers.47  One representative 
said that the proposed law was “unconstitutional, as it [would] deprive [the 
officers] of speaking and writing their minds; a right of which no law can 
divest them.”48  Another representative agreed, saying that the proposed law 
was “nugatory in itself, because it [would go] to deprive the citizens of an 
unalienable right, which you cannot take from them, nor can they divest 
themselves of it.”49  The bill’s proponent retorted that these officers’ 
freedoms were not as important as safeguarding the sanctity of elections, 
because “the violation of the freedom of elections was the greatest 
 
 40.  See DINAN, supra note 13, at 32; Graber, supra note 8 (describing this history). 
 41.  1 Stat. 596 (1798). 
 42.  See CURRIE, FEDERALIST PERIOD, supra note 12, at 260–62. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. at 273. 
 45.  See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273–76 (1964) (disavowing Sedition Act). 
 46.  See Kurt T. Lash, The Inescapable Federalism of the Ninth Amendment, 93 IOWA L. REV. 
801, 856–59 (2008) (relating contemporaneous Ninth Amendment arguments—previously forgotten 
by historians—made against Alien and Sedition Acts, and explaining how Ninth and Tenth 
Amendment arguments dovetailed).  The Tenth Amendment loomed larger than the Ninth in the 
arguments against the Sedition Act, marking in some sense the beginning of the decline of the Ninth 
Amendment in the public consciousness.  See Kurt T. Lash, James Madison’s Celebrated Report of 
1800: The Transformation of the Tenth Amendment, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 165 (2006). 
 47.  See 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1924–27 (1791). 
 48.  Id. at 1925 (comments of Rep. John Vining). 
 49.  Id. at 1927 (comments of Rep. Fisher Ames). 
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infringement on that Constitution.”50  Following this rights-based debate, the 
bill was defeated, twenty-one to thirty-seven.51 
This debate is a perfect example of a discussion of the Ninth 
Amendment’s “other rights” in Congress, because it took place in early 
1791, before the First Amendment and the rest of the Bill of Rights were 
ratified.  At that point, pretty much every right was unenumerated.52  Later 
that year, the Bill of Rights enumerated several rights and the Ninth 
Amendment declared that the remainder should not be denied or disparaged.  
In other words, unenumerated rights deserved at least the same consideration 
that they had always gotten—including congressional respect such as the 
revenue officers’ free expression rights had gotten earlier that year.53 
More broadly, that 1791 debate is a fine example of rights talk at its 
best: lawmakers taking the time to consider transcendent principles that 
should guide and constrain their work, instead of leaving that task to the 
courts or to nobody at all.54  Congress had fine debates about unenumerated 
rights in 1791;55 it can, and should, and does have such debates today. 
This raises obvious questions that deserve acknowledgement here, 
though they will not be addressed until later.  First, how does Congress 
establish something as a right?  Could the defeat of one bill, as in our 
internet-privacy example, suffice?56  Second, what does it mean to say in 
Congress that there is an unenumerated right at issue?  How do we know 
that the opponents of our hypothetical internet-surveillance bill were voting 
against it because they thought it violated a right to internet privacy, as 
opposed to voting against the bill because they thought its effects on internet 
privacy made it unforgivably bad policy?57  Third, is Congress really capable 
of—or interested in—conducting such discussions?58  Fourth, if a right is 
recognized in Congress, does that actually provide any protection for it?59  
 
 50.  Id. (comments of Rep. James Jackson). 
 51.  See id. (recording vote). 
 52.  By saying “pretty much every,” I recognize that in the unamended Constitution, Article I, 
Section 9 contained restrictions on congressional action that technically count as enumerated rights. 
 53.  This leaves to one side the question of what sort of judicial enforcement unenumerated 
rights were entitled to, either before or after the Bill of Rights and the Ninth Amendment were 
ratified.  See BARNETT, LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 8, at 236 (discussing judicial enforcement 
of unenumerated rights before and after 1791). 
 54.  See 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1924–27 (1791). 
 55.  See id. 
 56.  See infra Part III.C. 
 57.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 58.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 59.  See infra Part IV.C. 
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Before turning to these issues, though, we need to expand our consideration 
beyond negative rights. 
B.  Positive Rights and Other Sorts 
As suggested at the outset of the last section, some people might think 
that Ninth Amendment rights are negative because they read the rights 
enumerated in the rest of the Bill of Rights as negative.60  But the 
enumerated rights in the Bill need not be read solely that way.  For instance, 
the Sixth Amendment right of a criminal defendant to counsel has been 
interpreted as requiring the government to provide an attorney when the 
defendant is indigent.61  This makes it partly a positive right: something that 
the government has an affirmative duty to provide to the right-holder. 
Others would argue more generally that American constitutional rights 
were not all frozen in amber in 1791 or 1868 (when the Fourteenth 
Amendment was ratified).62  It is not just theorists who take a broader view; 
courts have found all manner of rights in the Constitution that would have 
scandalized America’s pre-constitutional forebears.63  Despite the fact that 
the Ninth Amendment speaks of “retained” rights—i.e., rights that already 
existed in 1791—it would seem that Ninth Amendment rights should be 
susceptible to modernization at least as much as their enumerated brethren.64  
This could include not just negative rights but positive rights or any other 
sorts of rights “which we don’t now think of.”65 
To be sure, the judicial recognition of rights that did not exist in 1791 or 
 
 60.  See supra Part III.A. 
 61.  Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); see also Wenar & Macedo, supra note 32, at 
293 (“America’s politics of rights has never been about securing negative rights only.”). 
 62.  See MASSEY, supra note 7, at 129. 
 63.  See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down sodomy law as violating 
Due Process Clause). 
 64.  See MASSEY, supra note 7, at 129–31 (arguing that, despite “retained” language, Ninth 
Amendment rights “are a dynamic, evolving list”).  There are other theories as to what the 
amendment means by “retained.”  See, e.g., BARNETT, LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 8, at 54–55 
(equating retained rights with natural rights). 
 65.  Letter from Edmund Pendleton to Richard Henry Lee (June 14, 1788) [hereinafter Pendleton 
Letter], in 2 THE LETTERS AND PAPERS OF EDMUND PENDLETON, 1734–1803, at 530, 533 (David 
John Mays ed., 1967); see Black, supra note 23, at 1107, 1113 (arguing for Ninth Amendment 
positive right to livelihood); Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Rhetoric and the Ninth Amendment, 
64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 131, 160 (1988) (arguing in favor of positive Ninth Amendment rights).   
  Pendleton’s full phrase in defense of the Ninth Amendment is: “Again is there not danger in 
the Enumeration of Rights?  May we not in the progress of things, discover some great and 
Important [right], which we don’t now think of?”  Pendleton Letter, supra, at 532–33.  This certainly 
seems to suggest that at least one member of the Founding generation saw the point of the Ninth 
Amendment as protecting new rights.  To be fair, though, this is one stray comment in the context of 
an argument making a different point.  See Thomas B. McAffee, The Original Meaning of the Ninth 
Amendment, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1215, 1276 n.232 (1990) (discussing context of Pendleton’s 
statement). 
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1868 has scandalized some contemporary thinkers as well; it is not as though 
everyone would accept new, positive Ninth Amendment rights coming out of 
Congress as valid.66  But plenty of people would not limit themselves to an 
eighteenth-century catalog of negative rights.  Indeed, Congress has 
legislated positive rights into existence already.67  To that extent, this article 
is not calling on Congress to pass unprecedented sorts of legislation so much 
as it is calling on Congress to think differently about what it is already 
doing. 
More pragmatically, if the point of the Ninth Amendment in Congress is 
that Congress should think about rights other than those listed in the 
Constitution, then every sort of right is on the table—whether negative, 
positive, or otherwise—so long as Congress can muster a sufficient 
consensus for it.68  The Ninth Amendment might not refer directly to new, 
modern rights, but it also does not foreclose Congress from conceiving of 
them. 
Moreover, the current constitutional landscape clearly gives Congress 
the power to establish positive rights.  Think of the 1787 Constitution as 
defining a space within which Congress can legislate.  Each specific grant of 
power to Congress expands that space.  Each enumerated negative right 
serves as an exception to those powers, and thus shrinks the space 
accordingly.69  As the last section suggested, the Ninth Amendment 
recognizes that there are other negative rights, such that Congress can shrink 
or close off other parts of the space that would have otherwise been available 
 
 66.  Cf. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 
183–85 (1990) (rejecting, in the context of judicially-created rights, the Ninth Amendment as “a 
warrant for [the creation of] rights not mentioned in the Constitution,” and asserting that it is best 
understood as a preservation of those rights “already held by the people under their state charters” at 
the time of the Founding). 
 67.  See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400, 1408(a)(2)(C)(i) (referring to certain children’s right to “free 
appropriate public education”); OPEN Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-175, § 2(6), 121 
Stat. 2524, 2524–25 (2007) (referring, in amendments to the Freedom of Information Act, to 
Congress’s duty to vindicate the public’s “fundamental ‘right to know’”). 
 68.  See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 14, at 5 (“The republic of statutes we describe 
transcends the libertarian bias in Large ‘C’ Constitutional rights. . . .  [S]tatutes commonly provide 
positive rights to people, providing them with legal means to combat oppression and 
discrimination.”); infra Part III.C (describing necessary consensus). 
 69.  But see Berger, supra note 16, at 960–62 (decrying those who consider rights to be the 
converse of powers).  I am comfortable with my own informal usage here, insofar as the government 
lacks the ability to act when doing so would violate a right, because that act would be void.  See 
MASSEY, supra note 7, at 67, 89–91 (describing the Framers’ sense of rights and powers as 
complementary, but explaining how this view has faded in favor of the modern view of rights as 
trumps, and how that shift has led to modern views of the Ninth Amendment as being about 
individual rights instead of federalism). 
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to it.70  It is not 1791, though.  Subsequent constitutional amendments have 
given Congress new powers.71  More significantly, broad constructions of 
the Commerce Clause and the Spending Clause have greatly expanded 
Congress’s constitutional space.72  If the original space was a small 
neighborhood, the current space is a big city.73 
Even if the Ninth Amendment was only referring to rights Americans 
had in 1791, it was referring to those rights vis-à-vis the powers Congress 
had in 1791.  When there is not as much that the government can do, there 
are not as many rights that the government can violate.  New or enlarged 
powers thus tee up new or enlarged rights; it is no coincidence that the 
Supreme Court’s modern era of civil rights and civil liberties—putting some 
oomph behind the Bill of Rights beyond anything seen before—began in 
earnest almost immediately after the Supreme Court began allowing 
expansive federal power in the 1930s.74  Space-wise, it follows that the more 
new streets the government can go down, the more buildings there will be to 
consider declaring off-limits. 
But that is negative-rights talk.  Positive rights function differently in 
this extended metaphor.  With the great expansion of federal power, 
Congress has plenty of room in which to introduce positive rights.  Instead 
of powers (space the federal government is permitted to occupy) and 
negative rights (space it is forbidden to occupy), positive rights are spaces 
that the federal government is required to occupy.75  So if congressional 
deliberations are infused with the spirit of the Ninth Amendment, and if 
there is an adequate consensus that a particular unenumerated positive right 
exists (e.g., a right to old-age pensions), and there is certainty that Congress 
has sufficient power to implement that right (e.g., the spending and 
commerce powers), then Congress would feel compelled to act (e.g., to 
 
 70.  This is part one of why I disagree with John Hart Ely’s contention that “the Ninth 
Amendment was not designed to grant Congress authority to create additional rights, to amend 
Article I, Section 8 by adding a general power to protect rights.”  JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY 
AND DISTRUST 37 (1980).  When we are dealing with negative rights, it is not an exercise of 
authority for Congress to recognize or respect a new right through the exercise of self-restraint.  See 
also infra note 76 (continuing Ely discussion). 
 71.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2; id. amend. XIV, § 5; id. amend. XV, § 2; id. amend. XIX, 
§ 2; id. amend. XXIII, § 2; id. amend. XXIV, § 2; id. amend. XXVI, § 2. 
 72.  See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578–79 (2012) (noting 
Congress’s “expansive” power to regulate via the Commerce Clause and “considerable influence” 
via the Spending Clause, made “broader still” by the Necessary and Proper Clause). 
 73.  Cf. BARNETT, LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 8, at 1 (“The Constitution that was originally 
enacted and formally amended creates islands of government powers in a sea of liberty.  The 
judicially redacted constitution creates islands of liberty rights in a sea of governmental powers.”). 
 74.  See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 75.  Congress can also act affirmatively to vindicate negative rights; consider the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, in which Congress used its commerce power to grant Americans new rights against 
private discrimination.  Cf. BARNETT, LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 8, at 57 (arguing that some 
natural rights are affirmative, making them difficult to enumerate as limits on government). 
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develop, maintain, or protect a social-security system).76 
As with negative rights, the list of possible positive rights is infinite, as 
befits the open-ended nature of the Ninth Amendment.  Indeed, there are 
ample examples to be drawn from actual political debates; liberal politicians 
say that there is a right to affordable housing, or access to health care, or 
education—rights that are left to Congress either because they are not in the 
Constitution or because courts under-enforce them.77  The conservative reply 
is to decry this notion.  Conservatives might think that the federal 
government does not have the power to act in these areas, in these ways.  
Other conservatives might accept Congress’s power but not agree that 
Congress should treat these “wants” as rights.  The list of possible rights 
may be infinite, but the congressional advocates of a particular right still 
need to win over enough of their colleagues before a right can go from 
possible to actual. 
The same goes for so-called collective rights (like the right to a healthy 
environment, or intergenerational equity), or animal rights, or really any 
sort.  One important category is state-based rights, which are also not 
completely enumerated in the Constitution.  Kurt Lash has made a strong 
case that the original understanding of the Ninth Amendment was that it 
would constrain federal action, in the service of maintaining a proper 
 
 76.  See Owen Fiss, Between Supremacy and Exclusivity, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 187, 194 (2007) 
(discussing Congress’s use of commerce power to enhance rights); Young, supra note 14, at 445–46 
(discussing how “this sort of extracanonical supplementation is a primary means by which a 
Constitution that is very old and hard to amend manages to serve the needs of a modern and highly 
complex society”).  This is part two of why I disagree with John Hart Ely’s contention that “the 
Ninth Amendment was not designed to grant Congress authority to create additional rights, to amend 
Article I, Section 8 by adding a general power to protect rights.”  ELY, supra note 70, at 37.  
Congress does not need some sort of general power to protect rights in order to establish positive 
rights.  It can rely instead on enumerated powers, like commerce or spending.  See supra note 70 
(beginning Ely discussion). 
 77.  See President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to the Congress on the State of the Union 
(Jan. 11, 1944), reprinted in CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS 235, 242–43 (2004) 
(proclaiming “second Bill of Rights” including rights to economic security, housing, health, and 
education).  For three random examples from the countless ones extant, see 158 CONG. REC. E427 
(daily ed. Mar. 22, 2012) (statement of Rep. Sheila Jackson-Lee) (“While the U.S. Constitution and 
Supreme Court interpretations do not identify a constitutional right to health care for those who 
cannot afford it, Congress has enacted numerous statutes . . . that establish and define specific 
statutory rights of individuals to receive health care services from the government.”); 149 CONG. 
REC. 28,443 (2003) (statement of Rep. Steve Israel) (referring to children’s “inalienable right to an 
education”); 143 CONG. REC. 7519 (1997) (statement of Rep. Bobby Rush) (referring to “the 
people’s right to affordable housing”). 
  On under-enforcement—the idea that courts should not try to do everything themselves, and 
that by under-enforcing some constitutional provisions they create space for Congress to vindicate 
those provisions—see SAGER, supra note 12, at 101–02. 
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federalist balance and allowing states to protect rights.78  Since the New 
Deal, the primary focus has shifted away from federalism and toward 
individual rights,79 but there are still plenty of people interested in 
federalism. 
Again, whatever particular rights the Framers of the Ninth Amendment 
might have had in mind, if Congress shows enough support over enough 
time for the notion that any particular right exists, in any particular form, 
then it exists.  The Ninth Amendment serves to remind Congress of this 
possibility. 
C.  A Republic of Statutes 
An important recent book by William Eskridge and John Ferejohn, A 
Republic of Statutes, has implications for the Ninth Amendment in 
Congress.80  The book describes the ways in which certain “superstatutes” 
are part of the American constitution in the lowercase-c sense of the word.81  
That is, these statutes form part of the bedrock of the structure of American 
government, despite not being part of the document that we call the 
(uppercase-C) Constitution.  Many of these constitutive statutes deal with 
structure rather than rights, but there are plenty of the latter, making 
Eskridge and Ferejohn’s arguments highly relevant to this article.82 
The past ninety years have seen a vast increase in the rights of 
Americans, and very little of it has come through the constitutional 
amendment process.83  Some of this increase has come from court decisions 
finding things in the Constitution, but a fair amount has come through 
federal legislation that does not purport to derive the rights from the 
Constitution at all.84 
Eskridge and Ferejohn note several places where statutes are “the 
exclusive mechanism by which public norms have formed around the 
protection of individual or minority rights.”85  Their examples include anti-
discrimination rights for pregnant women, certain aspects of the right to an 
education, the “right[] to compete in a free and fair market, to decent 
 
 78.  See LASH, supra note 8, at 31–34. 
 79.  See MASSEY, supra note 7, at 97–98 (describing this shift). 
 80.  ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 14; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, 
Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215 (2001). 
 81.  For more on the notion of statute-based rights forming part of the U.S. small-c constitution, 
see Young, supra note 14. 
 82.  See, e.g., ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 14, at 73. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. at 6.  Some has come from both—consider that Brown v. Board of Education did not 
amount to much in practical effect until Congress (eventually) passed legislation to make it so.  See 
id. 
 85.  Id. at 11–12. 
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housing and adequate medical care, [and] to security against old age, 
sickness, accident, and unemployment.”86  Congress has thus brought plenty 
of unenumerated rights to life, even if it has not cited the Ninth Amendment 
in doing so. 
Congress can back up these rights by providing or implying causes of 
action to enforce them in court.87  But this is different—less—than what I, or 
Eskridge and Ferejohn, mean by a right here.  Being a right entails being 
entrenched: protected more than an ordinary statute is from repeal or change.  
These distinctions will be explored in greater depth in Part IV.A, but for now 
the point is that some so-called rights coming out of Congress do not rise to 
the level of Ninth Amendment rights that actually constrain Congress. 
Eskridge and Ferejohn describe a pattern of processes by which 
superstatutes entrench some rights.88  These rights start merely as goals.89  
The goals are generally contested, and legislation to advance them may be 
controversial at first.90  An initial statute passes and is implemented in ways 
that not only prove the opponents’ worries to be misplaced, but actually 
convince most of the opponents that the norm is a good one (even though 
there may still be disagreements at the margins).91  From that point, the 
statute acquires an “enthusiastic and dynamic and growing base of popular 
support,” which leads to the statute being entrenched, and perhaps 
expanded.92  Social Security, which began rather modestly and is now part of 
the American (small-c) constitutional fabric, is a perfect example.93 
Rather than coming out of “constitutional moments,” these statute-based 
rights get entrenched incrementally, without “dramatic showdowns and 
conflict.”94  (Social Security is deeply entrenched, for instance, but it did not 
get that way overnight.95)  As Eskridge and Ferejohn have written elsewhere, 
the key is “neither how much public attention and enthusiasm accompanies a 
law’s adoption nor how long the law lasts.”96  Rather, to become entrenched, 
the statute must substantially alter the status quo, and “‘stick[]’ in the public 
 
 86.  Id. at 12. 
 87.  See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) (declaring congressional intent to 
be the key element required to find implied causes of action). 
 88.  ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 14, at 17. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  See id. at 7–8. 
 91.  Id. at 7. 
 92.  Id. at 17. 
 93.  Id. at 166. 
 94.  Id. at 165. 
 95.  Id. at 166. 
 96.  Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 80, at 1230. 
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culture in a deep way, becoming foundational or axiomatic to our 
thinking.”97 
All of this provides some perspective on what Ninth Amendment 
discussions would look like in Congress.  A member of Congress typically 
would not establish a right simply by striding into the Capitol and arguing 
that some previously unrecognized interest is not only suddenly essential as 
a matter of policy, but is actually a full-fledged right.  Instead, one would 
expect to see other sorts of arguments: A member pointing to a long series of 
enactments (federal or state98) and arguing that they represent a right, such 
that it would take more than a mere policy argument to repeal them.  Or a 
member noting that the series of enactments must be extended to cover more 
people and so fully respect the right, or that it must be funded and thereby 
vindicate the right for people who cannot afford it themselves.  Regardless, 
the development of these rights would be a lengthy process, not a singular 
event.99 
A Republic of Statutes demonstrates that Congress has, in fact, 
established a lot of these real, entrenched rights.  The facts on the ground are 
such that this article’s approach—calling for Congress to consider and 
respect unenumerated rights—has substantial actual practice on its side.  But 
while A Republic of Statutes describes how Congress has created 
superstatutes, it does not claim that Congress has used Eskridge and 
Ferejohn’s process knowingly, nor that Congress has characterized its 
actions with the terms that Eskridge and Ferejohn do.  This article calls not 
only for Congress to deliberate about entrenching unenumerated rights, but 
to do so self-consciously.  The Ninth Amendment says that Congress should 
remember to consider unenumerated rights; it only makes sense that when 
Congress entrenches such rights, it should do so mindfully. 
If Congress were to conduct its debates over unenumerated rights more 
consciously and mindfully, this would potentially supplement the process 
that Eskridge and Ferejohn describe.  Their main insight—that entrenchment 
requires a deep consensus that emerges only from a lengthy process—
remains.100  It would seem, however, that making the process more 
conscious would add both focus and legitimacy to it. 
Although Eskridge and Ferejohn concentrate on positive rights, we can 
return to our negative-rights example about the internet-surveillance bill and 
 
 97.  Id. at 1231. 
 98.  See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 14, at 16 (introducing the notion of convergence of 
state statutes acquiring superstatute status).  This is as good a place as any to mention that some 
people might be convinced that a particular right exists, but deny that it should be considered a 
federal right, as opposed to a state right.  See id. at 172 (noting people making this distinction as to 
social security). 
 99.  Cf. id. at 6–9. 
 100.  See supra notes 95–97 and accompanying text. 
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the right to internet privacy to make this point.101  A member of Congress 
objects that the bill would violate a right to internet privacy.  This argument 
would not be out of the blue; the member would point to precedents (“the 
government has never attempted such a gross intrusion” and “previous 
attempts to intrude to this degree have all been defeated/discredited”) and 
suggest that they are not only persuasive but binding.  This would afford an 
opportunity for Congress to debate the member’s reckoning of the 
precedents; whether it would like to continue down that path or veer from it; 
and the notion of congressional precedent more generally.102  It might also 
increase the stakes—if proponents say not just that something is a good idea 
but that it is a right, they are raising the bar for themselves and they risk 
losing everything.103  They also risk cheapening the category of rights 
through promiscuous use of the label.104  In any case, though, the discussion 
would be open, and the results correspondingly more legitimate. 
For positive rights, the argument would be similar.  The positive 
government action would have to begin at some point, perhaps with a 
declaration that it was in the furtherance of a newly recognized right, but 
more likely not, given political realities.105  Further efforts to strengthen or 
broaden that action would draw upon prior precedents; efforts to weaken or 
repeal the action would face resistance because of those precedents.  With 
enough successful efforts, reflecting enough of a consensus, the positive 
right would be entrenched along the lines that Eskridge and Ferejohn sketch 
out—but again, the debate would be conscious and richer, and the results 
more legitimate. 
D.  A Parting Thought 
This puts a new spin on the age-old clash between (1) those who call for 
a right and (2) those who retort that people don’t acquire a constitutional 
 
 101.  See supra pp. 83–84. 
 102.  See Gerhardt, supra note 12 (discussing nature and functions of congressional precedent, a 
category that extends well beyond rights). 
 103.  See TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 141–42 (noting that sometimes, losing an argument about 
something being a constitutional right hurts one’s political argument that, constitutional right or not, 
Congress should still provide it). 
 104.  Cf. Conor Gearty, Reflections on Human Rights and Civil Liberties in Light of the United 
Kingdom’s Human Rights Act 1998, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 3 (2001) (noting, with human rights, “the 
risk that the term will become useless through overuse.  (How can you play the game of politics 
when all the cards are trumps?)”). 
 105.  See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 14, at 171–75 (describing the modest rhetoric 
accompanying creation of Social Security, in terms of its character as a right). 
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right to something just because they really, really want to have it.  The 
second group is correct, but the Ninth Amendment tells us that their 
argument does not refute the first group.106  Rights need not be in the 
Constitution to carry weight.107 
That said, the Ninth Amendment’s admonitions are part of the 
Constitution.  The unenumerated rights that Congress entrenches in the ways 
described above can be considered rights by the Constitution, even if they 
are not rights in the Constitution.108 
IV.  SOME QUESTIONS 
This part of the article is devoted to answering obvious criticisms of the 
notion that the Ninth Amendment has a role to play in Congress.  The first 
and most important criticism is that “right” is a misnomer for what is 
actually just a strong policy preference.  The second is that Congress has no 
aptitude for debating rights.  The third is that congressional respect for the 
Ninth Amendment would not actually protect rights. 
A.  Are These Rights or Just Good Ideas? 
For the Ninth Amendment to matter in Congress, calling something a 
right there must actually mean something.  It is not immediately apparent, 
however, what the real difference is between saying “we cannot/must pass 
this law because it violates/vindicates the right to X” and saying “we 
cannot/must pass this law because it is a very bad/good idea in light of our 
national interest in X.”109 
1.  Entrenchment 
Adrian Vermeule is a trenchant critic of A Republic of Statutes.110  He 
asks questions similar to that in the previous paragraph, and he rejects the 
 
 106.  See MASSEY, supra note 7, at 3. 
 107.  Ninth Amendment rights are not in the Constitution, and as such, any deprivation of them is 
not directly unconstitutional.  To be sure, these rights might be constitutional in the lowercase-c 
sense of being foundational, as opposed to being mandated by the Constitution.  See supra note 14. 
 108.  Cf. Sager, supra note 5, at 239 (noting how the Ninth Amendment is “about rather than of 
the Constitution”). 
 109.  See Adrian Vermeule, Superstatutes, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 26, 2010, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.tnr.com/book/review/superstatutes (reviewing ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 14) 
(citing Daryl Levinson for notion that “the move to a de facto interpretation of entrenchment makes 
it precious hard to distinguish a statute that survives because it is somehow resistant to change from 
a statute that survives just because people today like it and have no desire to change it”).  Laws 
against murder, for instance, are extremely well-entrenched, but they may not have constitutional 
status.  Id. 
 110.  See id. 
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notion that the superstatutes Eskridge and Ferejohn describe are necessarily 
constitutional in the lowercase-c sense of the word111 (for the sake of 
simplicity, I will assume here that what I call rights are what Vermeule, 
Eskridge, and Ferejohn would call lowercase-c constitutional): 
Eskridge and Ferejohn basically describe the give-and-take struggle 
of lawmaking and regulation on more or less humdrum subjects—
family and medical leave, antitrust, clean water laws—and then 
attach the label “constitutional” to the results.  But if everything is 
constitutional, nothing is.  The nagging merit of the book is that 
there is, clearly, some category of superstatutes with more than 
ordinary force and stature; but after reading the book, the nature and 
boundaries of that category are all the more opaque.112 
This section humbly suggests that the Ninth Amendment approach can 
address Vermeule’s objection about clarifying the “nature and boundaries” 
of special statutes. 
As discussed in the last section, Eskridge and Ferejohn have laid out a 
process by which statutes can win over opponents and become entrenched to 
the point of being axiomatic.113  This entrenchment means that it is harder 
than usual—not just hard, but harder—to repeal or weaken these statutes.114  
Vermeule’s point remains, though: is it not the case that statute-law becomes 
harder to change simply by virtue of being popular?115  Popularity can lead 
to a sort of political or practical entrenchment,116 but that is different from 
the sort of legal entrenchment that a designation of “right” suggests.  
Eskridge and Ferejohn offer some answers to this that relate to the treatment 
of superstatutes in court, a topic covered in Part III.C above.  For now, 
though, the discussion must stay with entrenchment. 
Eskridge and Ferejohn failed to convince Vermeule of their theory that a 
combination of deliberation and consensus elevate their superstatutes to an 
extra-entrenched status.117  Vermeule says that the “acid test of entrenchment 
 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id.; see supra note 14 (distinguishing lowercase-c constitution from uppercase-C 
Constitution). 
 113.  See supra Part III.C.  But see Young, supra note 14, at 448–49, 454–59 (rejecting notion that 
statutes must be entrenched in order to obtain small-c constitutional status). 
 114.  See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 14, at 102–18 (describing process and nature of 
statutory entrenchment). 
 115.  See Vermeule, supra note 109. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id.  To be fair to Eskridge and Ferejohn, they talk not just about entrenchment but also about 
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occurs when a statute survives despite the opposition of a current majority or 
supermajority,” but he also notes that this essentially describes every statute 
extant because of the Constitution’s “elaborate lawmaking process.”118  Still, 
as the quotation above shows, he believes that there are some extraordinary 
statutes.  The question remains, then: what entrenches these statutes 
distinctly? 
The Ninth Amendment approach offers one answer.  If, as the modern 
view has it, rights are “trumps taking precedence over the principles of 
democracy and the public good,”119 then their essence in a representative 
legislature is to make legislators vote against what would otherwise be the 
right result.  This, in turn, presumes that there are legislators who are 
capable of distinguishing consciously between mere preferences and real 
restraints—between “should not” and “cannot.”  To amend Vermeule’s acid 
test, a statute is entrenched when it survives because of legislators who 
support the statute only because it is entrenched, other arguments of policy 
and politics notwithstanding.  Returning to our space metaphor, there is a 
difference between policy (saying that it is a good idea for Congress to 
decline to occupy a particular legislative space) and right (saying that that 
space is actually sealed off). 
Assuming again that members of Congress are capable of making such 
distinctions,120 it certainly seems that it would help immensely for them to be 
having actual discussions about unenumerated rights qua rights.  By making 
the discussion conscious,121 the Ninth Amendment approach adds a vital 
self-awareness to the process.  With a conscious process, an entrenched right 
is entrenched because enough of Congress directly and explicitly says that it 
is—a boundary that should satisfy Vermeule.  This need not rule out further 
debate.  Members could agree that the right is a right, disagree that it is a 
right, or even disagree that Congress should be trafficking in such 
distinctions.  The point is that the right must be able to win the debate. 
That addresses the boundaries of the category, but what about its nature?  
We still need to know how a right would actually function differently in 
Congress than other, ordinary principles do.  To some extent this has been 
 
a sort of social engraining process.  See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 14, at 28 (discussing 
how superstatutes “are supported not just by the normal obligation to obey the law but also by a 
broader social network”). 
 118.  Vermeule, supra note 109. 
 119.  WIKTOR OSIATYŃSKI, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITS 73 (2009) (discussing Ronald 
Dworkin’s definition of a right).  The notion of rights as trumps is a more modern approach; the 
older view was of rights as limits to powers.  See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 120.  See infra Part IV.B.  Keith Whittington has defended Congress’s ability to reject good policy 
for being unconstitutional.  See Whittington, supra note 12, at 841.  But see Larry Alexander & 
Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1368 & 
n.41 (1997) (arguing to the contrary). 
 121.  See supra Part III.C. 
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covered above: A right would serve as a trump, with members feeling 
constrained to vote differently than immediate policy or political 
considerations would otherwise lead them to do.122  A right would thus be 
entrenched more than it would be as an ordinary statutory provision. 
Another key is enforcement.  One enforcement mechanism is political.  
Something that is labeled a right will carry more weight and be harder to 
defeat in a political debate.  This does not lead us back to our original 
problem; the point is that being a right is a cause of the heightened political 
potency, not merely a reflection of it.  Classifying something as a right, and 
doing so consciously and openly, “would have a distinct and durable impact 
on political perceptions.”123 
Such boundaries are still somewhat nebulous, though.  By definition, 
when a right is unenumerated, it lacks the certainty and precision of a right 
that has been expressed in a fixed text.  But this flexibility is at least as much 
a benefit of the Ninth Amendment approach as it is a drawback.  Unlike 
enumerated-rights arguments that can get bogged down in the enterprise of 
shoehorning new concepts into old categories (such as whether burning a 
flag is speech), unenumerated rights are supple and better able to evolve 
with the changing times.124  Being flexible in this way is not inconsistent 
with being entrenched; an ability to move and evolve is not the same as a 
susceptibility to evaporation. 
Procedure could provide a more objective effect.  The House and Senate 
could, for instance, pass internal rules that require certain types of debate or 
certain kinds of votes to overcome a rights-based objection.125  Having these 
sorts of debates or votes would yield a result and produce a record, both of 
which could then be brought to bear in subsequent debates and votes.  The 
designation of something as a right, in other words, could have a 
precedential effect inside Congress. 
Records of debates and votes would be especially important for negative 
rights, because such rights would manifest themselves primarily in laws that 
are not passed, leaving debates and votes as the only sort of hard evidence of 
 
 122.  See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 123.  SAGER, supra note 12, at 127.  Sager uses this phrase in the service of a slightly different 
point: the effect it would have on political perceptions for Congress (and the President and courts) to 
accept a “constitutional right to minimum welfare and a constitutional obligation to repair the 
entrenched residue of structural injustice,” which Sager considers mandated by the Constitution and 
thus not unenumerated as such.  Id. at 126–27. 
 124.  See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 221 (1999). 
 125.  Cf. TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 16, 196 n.35 (describing the existing Senate process for 
considering constitutional issues). 
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their existence.126  Positive rights, by contrast, would be embodied in laws, 
which could include congressional declarations of the rights in their text or 
legislative history.  To be sure, there is already unenumerated-rights talk in 
legislation,127 but these are rights in the sense of being judicially enforceable 
rather than being entrenched in Congress itself.  Similar sorts of formal 
declarations could be part of a more robust and systematic understanding 
of—and use of—Ninth Amendment rights in Congress. 
Declarations like these could also appear in the text or legislative history 
of laws that constitute a rejection of a negative right.  Such a declaration 
might sound odd: “For the following reasons, the committee does not 
consider this law to violate the right to internet privacy declared in the 
Senate’s vote of May 4, 2019 on S. 2345” or “For the following reasons, the 
committee does not consider that there exists a right to internet privacy with 
which this bill would conflict.”  But presumably this strangeness would fade 
with repetition. 
Finally, the House and Senate could impose supermajority requirements 
on themselves.128  They could, for instance, require the support of a three-
fifths majority to pass a law that establishes a right or, once established, to 
alter or abolish a right.  This would provide entrenchment in its most direct 
and undeniable sense, and would clearly mark the rights in question as more 
than just good ideas.  Why is this not, therefore, the principal argument in 
this section?  Because a supermajority requirement for votes on rights is not 
necessary; Congress could do all of the other things mentioned in this 
section even without a supermajority requirement.  Moreover, not everybody 
agrees that such a self-imposed supermajority requirement would be 
constitutional.129  Nevertheless, a supermajority requirement would certainly 
clarify things, and would make these rights much more meaningful. 
Entrenchment is relative, of course.  Members of Congress could always 
 
 126.  See Gerhardt, supra note 12, at 719 (contending that discoverability is necessary before 
something can be precedential); id. at 738 (noting possibility of precedential effect of congressional 
inaction). 
 127.  See supra note 67 (citing two examples).  The House of Representatives recently amended 
its Rule XII, requiring members to specify the specific constitutional powers under which their bills 
are allowed.  See H.R. Res. 5, 112th Cong. (2011) (enacted).  Some of these “constitutional authority 
statements” reference the Ninth Amendment, albeit perfunctorily.  See, e.g., 157 CONG. REC. 
H5373–74 (daily ed. July 21, 2011) (statement of Rep. Ron Paul regarding H.R. 2613) (asserting 
authority for repeal of Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 under the Second, Ninth, and Tenth 
Amendments). 
 128.  See, e.g., S. DOC. NO. 112-1, at 8–9 (2011); H.R. DOC. NO. 111-157, at 668, 889–90 (2011). 
 129.  See, e.g., Susan Low Bloch, Congressional Self-Discipline: The Constitutionality of 
Supermajority Rules, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 1 (1997) (arguing against constitutionality of self-
imposed congressional supermajority requirements).  The argument that self-imposed supermajority 
requirements are constitutional is essentially that either House can bind itself however it pleases, so 
long as it passes the rules doing so by simple majority votes.  See generally John O. McGinnis & 
Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority Requirements: A Defense, 
105 YALE L.J. 483 (1995) (expounding this position). 
KALT W.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/10/2013  12:59 PM 
[Vol. 40: 75, 2012] The Ninth Amendment in Congress 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
101 
reject, distinguish, or ignore their own precedents, just like their associates 
across the street at the Supreme Court can do.  Nevertheless, if one is 
looking for meaning in Congress’s designation of something as a right, the 
conscious creation of precedential weight, perhaps along with a 
supermajority requirement, is a good place to start. 
2.  Congressional Rights Outside Congress 
If Congress takes the Ninth Amendment to heart, it would have an 
impact in courts and in the executive branch. 
First, the courts.  The issue is not whether a right gives people the ability 
to sue; Congress’s power to create causes of action is not in dispute.  
Congressionally recognized Ninth Amendment rights would do more in 
court.  As an example, Eskridge and Ferejohn describe how their analogous 
superstatutes exert a gravitational pull that influences courts’ interpretation 
of other statutes and sometimes even of constitutional provisions.130  In the 
latter case, Congress actually can help unenumerated rights become 
enumerated ones.131 
Relatedly, by cementing something as a right Congress might also 
establish it as a liberty interest, or as a “traditional practice,”132 or other 
things of the mushy sort that courts sometimes latch onto to provide 
constitutional due-process protections.  Once again, Congress’s action could 
lead the courts to find the unenumerated right in the Due Process Clauses of 
the Constitution, and thereby enumerate it. 
As a general matter, it seems that the more seriously and explicitly 
Congress discusses rights, the more seriously the product of those 
discussions would be taken in court.133  This is true even though the rights 
 
 130.  See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 14, at 6, 27 (discussing how superstatutes 
“transform Constitutional baselines”); William N. Eskridge Jr. & John Ferejohn, Quasi 
Constitutional Law: The Rise of Super-Statutes, in DEVINS & WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 198, 
199 (describing how such statutes “tend to trump ordinary legislation when there are clashes or 
inconsistencies,” and thereby “bend and reshape the surrounding landscape” with their “normative 
gravity”). 
 131.  See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 14, at 27 (arguing that superstatutes like the Voting 
Rights Act “sometimes rival Constitutional rules, bending an ambiguous or even hostile 
Constitutional tradition to acquiesce in superstatutory innovations”); see also TUSHNET, supra note 
13, at 18–19 (offering a similar point). 
 132.  See TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 18–19 (discussing how courts might look to legislation to 
gauge constitutional concepts like “evolving standards of decency”). 
 133.  See BARNETT, LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 8, at 260 (arguing that courts’ presumption 
that Congress acts constitutionally was more justifiable when Congress had more serious 
constitutional discussions); Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 80, at 1253 (arguing that courts should 
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that Congress would be recognizing would not be directly enforceable in 
court, let alone constitutionally mandated. 
On the administrative-law side, if Congress posits that a right exists, it 
could affect the courts’ review of an agency’s implementation of a statute.  
There might be less room for deference to the agency, for instance, because 
Congress has limited the agency’s discretion regarding the right, and thereby 
reduced the range of acceptable interpretations of the statute that the agency 
might come up with.134 
Relatedly, the Senate could make Ninth Amendment rights part of the 
executive confirmation process.135  Imagine senators grilling presidential 
nominees about such rights.  Senators who felt that there was an important 
right to internet privacy, say, or to affordable housing, could seek assurances 
that the President’s nominees would interpret and execute the statutes within 
their bailiwick accordingly.  This would draw the President (who already 
would have participated in the legislative process that gave rise to the right 
in the first place) further into the rights debate, adding more weight and 
legitimacy to rights that the President supports.  This would also help to 
draw administrative agencies into the rights-making process.  Their actual 
implementation of statutes—acting broadly to vindicate positive rights (or 
not), or shrinking back from violating negative rights (or not)—would make 
a big difference in how rights would fare.136 
In sum, congressional consideration of Ninth Amendment rights would 
affect Congress, the courts, the President, and administrative agencies.  
Being a right would thus elevate these principles in too many ways to write 
them off as mere popular policy. 
B.  Is Congress Up to the Task? 
Another critique, which emerges indirectly from the existing literature, 
is that Congress is not capable of deliberating effectively about 
unenumerated rights.  As discussed above in Part II, proponents of judicial 
enforcement of Ninth Amendment rights hold up the possibility of leaving 
the Ninth Amendment solely to Congress as almost a reductio ad absurdum, 
and even those who reject judicial enforcement in favor of political 
enforcement do not typically express any confidence in Congress’s 
 
more readily use purposive interpretations when dealing with superstatutes as opposed to regular 
statutes). 
 134.  Eskridge and Ferejohn also discuss how superstatute status should (and does) lead courts 
that are interpreting such statutes to try harder to vindicate the broad legislative purpose than they 
otherwise would.  Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 80, at 1253. 
 135.  Cf. TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 65 (observing that the right to privacy was set on a “firmer 
basis” by discussion of it in Senate confirmation hearings on judicial nominees). 
 136.  See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 14, at 266–69 (discussing agency contribution to the 
process of norms becoming superstatutes). 
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capabilities, leaving the impression that they have little regard for these 
rights qua rights.137 
This is unfair to Congress.  A large part of the “interpretation outside the 
courts” movement is dedicated to promoting Congress’s ability to have 
constitutional debates.  This was clearly the intent of the Constitution’s 
designers, and the great constitutional debates of the nation’s first century 
were conducted mainly in Congress.138  Even more recently, Congress has 
proven perfectly capable of having robust debates about religious freedom, 
the right to bear arms, and the rights implicated on both sides of the abortion 
debate, among many others.139  These debates are not limited to just trying to 
understand what the courts have said or to predict what the courts will say; 
members of Congress have expressed strong, independent views about the 
meaning of constitutional rights provisions.140 
If Congress can do this—and assuming that the robustness of these 
debates is a good thing—it can engage Ninth Amendment rights as well.  
Unenumerated rights are a different matter, to be sure, but they are arguably 
even better suited to congressional treatment than enumerated rights are.  
Courts deal with litigation, which is necessarily concrete, discrete, and 
retrospective;141 Congress deals with legislation, which is more abstract, 
general, and prospective.  Interpreting a fixed text like the Constitution, in 
the context of a live dispute, is thus more of a judicial task.142  By contrast, 
 
 137.  See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text. 
 138.  See Fisher, supra note 12, at 708–10 (describing early debates). 
 139.  See KRAMER, supra note 11, at 238 (listing instances of serious constitutional debate in 
Congress); PICKERILL, supra note 12, at 113 (noting Second Amendment arguments made in 
Congress against Brady Bill); Louis Fisher, Constitutional Analysis by Congressional Staff Agencies, 
in DEVINS & WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 64 (describing Congress’s capabilities in, and 
techniques for, constitutional interpretation); see also DEVINS, supra note 12, at 29–30 (describing 
process of congressional constitutional consideration, such as it is); Fisher, supra note 12 (defending 
congressional constitutional aptitude). 
 140.  In MORGAN, supra note 12, Donald Morgan surveyed the treatment of the Constitution in 
Congress and found both blitheness and a sense of responsibility.  As to the latter, most members 
Morgan surveyed at the time (the 1960s) agreed that members of Congress were supposed to make 
independent assessments of the constitutionality of proposed legislation, and believed that 
congressional constitutional arguments were at least partly bona fide, as opposed to being just 
pretexts and proxies for political arguments.  Id. at 8–9.  For a fine recent example of this sentiment, 
see Schmidt, supra note 1, at 230 (quoting Tea Party stalwart Senator Mike Lee as saying that his 
oath “means more than doing that which you can get away with in court”). 
 141.  See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (limiting the federal judiciary to the resolution of cases 
and controversies). 
 142.  There is a complicated relationship between constitutions and written-ness.  After the 
Founding, judicial review slowly emerged as a supplement to political consideration/enforcement of 
constitutional norms.  When John Marshall began interpreting the Constitution like a statute, it 
strengthened the notion that interpreting the Constitution is a fundamentally textual enterprise, and 
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having a more philosophical debate about which unwritten, abstract 
principles should guide legislative actions seems like a better fit for a 
deliberative, representative legislative body like Congress.143 
Skepticism about Congress’s abilities here often focuses on Congress’s 
policy orientation.  Congress may regard constitutional arguments as 
distractions, intended only to frustrate the achievement of urgent policy 
goals.144  President Franklin Roosevelt’s paradigmatic words to a 
congressional committee (“I hope your committee will not permit doubts as 
to constitutionality, however reasonable, to block the suggested legislation”) 
might sound brazen, but the sentiment they express does not sound at all 
dated.145  This seems largely to be a function of Congress’s abdication of 
 
thus something judges should do.  See KRAMER, supra note 11, at 149–50; Graber, supra note 8, at 
393–96.  But this still leaves the old ways—including congressional and popular interpretation—
available for non-textual tasks like considering Ninth Amendment rights. 
 143.  See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 140 (1977) (relating Learned Hand’s 
notion that “It is wrong to suppose . . . that claims about moral rights express anything more than the 
speakers’ preferences.  If the Supreme Court justifies its decisions by making such claims, rather 
than by relying on positive law, it is usurping the place of the legislature. . . .”); Thomas C. Grey, 
The Uses of an Unwritten Constitution, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 211, 223 (1988) (“[I]t is the 
Constitution’s status as a legal writing that is often said to make it subject to authoritative 
construction by judges, government officials whose primary training and experience is not in 
statesmanship, prophecy or political philosophy, but in the application of legal language to the 
resolution of disputes.”); Whittington, supra note 12, at 813 (questioning “the special competence of 
the courts to provide principled deliberation on constitutional values”); cf. U.S. CONST. art. V 
(assigning Congress a preeminent role in drafting new constitutional provisions); BARNETT, LOST 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 8, at 76 (conceding that one might “maintain that unenumerated natural 
rights are best protected by mechanisms other than direct judicial enforcement”).  But see MASSEY, 
supra note 7, at 203 (distrusting Congress to police its own limits); Brest, supra note 12, at 82 
(arguing that courts are best suited to constitutional interpretation because “adjudication as such is 
the paradigm of a disinterested decision procedure”); Sager, supra note 5, at 252 (arguing that judges 
are better placed than Congress to deal with unenumerated rights). 
  Maxwell Stearns has made a strong case to me that the very structure of a large legislative 
body like Congress makes it difficult to attribute its actions to any single, coherent rationale such as 
an understanding of a right.  Unlike judges, who are required to justify their decisions with written 
opinions, a single legislative decision can rest on hundreds of individual reasons or on no reasons at 
all.  In rejecting his conclusion, I am relying on both the history of serious, coherent deliberations in 
Congress and on the potential for improved future deliberations (especially at the committee level, 
where coherent written explanations are more common and where members of Congress can rely on 
their colleagues’ specialized expertise and focus). 
 144.  See MORGAN, supra note 12, at 24 (noting how constitutional objections can spur charges in 
Congress “of mere obstructionism, of reaction, even of subversion”); PICKERILL, supra note 12, at 
7–8, 27–28 (“Put simply, members of Congress do not have the time or institutional motivation to 
routinely raise and debate constitutional issues that arise in the context of popular legislation.”); 
Barbara Sinclair, Can Congress Be Trusted with the Constitution?, in DEVINS & WHITTINGTON, 
supra note 12, at 293, 293 (“‘The worst argument to use with a member when you’re trying to 
persuade him to vote against a proposal is that “It’s unconstitutional,”’ explained a senior 
Democratic leader . . . .”).  For a striking critique of Congress’s ability and performance in 
constitutional interpretation, see Mikva, supra note 12. 
 145.  79 CONG. REC. 13,449 (1935) (reproducing Roosevelt’s letter, which also said that “the 
situation is so urgent and the benefits of the legislation so evident that all doubts should be resolved 
in favor of the bill, leaving to the courts, in an orderly fashion, the ultimate question of 
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constitutional interpretive power to the courts.  In such a setting, the 
Constitution can appear to be just another tool for keeping Congress from 
passing a law, such that there is no reason for anyone but obstructionists to 
use it. 
Ninth Amendment rights do not suffer from this problem, though, 
because they do not have this posture.  Take as an example a senator who, 
spurred to think about such things by the Ninth Amendment, concludes that 
a proposed law would violate an unenumerated right (say, our right to 
internet privacy).146  That senator would not argue against the law by saying 
that the courts would find it unconstitutional; that would be a non sequitur 
because our hypothetical assumes that the right is not one that the courts 
have found in the Due Process Clause or elsewhere in the Constitution.  
Instead, the senator would be able to make a rights argument that is united in 
purpose with her policy argument: “This law doesn’t just entail ‘some costs’ 
in terms of internet privacy, it actually violates a right to internet privacy!”147  
There would be even less of a problem on the positive-rights side; there, the 
constitutional argument would support the legislation, not represent an 
attempt to squelch it. 
A final reason to think that Congress is up to the task is rooted in the 
somewhat circular nature of the very question.  Those who doubt Congress’s 
capacity to have a meaningful debate can talk about how Congress rarely 
attempts such debates and generally outsources the heavy lifting to the 
courts, but this is like a teenager who argues that he should not have to learn 
algebra because he’ll never use it.  The teenager is correct only because he 
cannot use something he has not learned.  Those who believe in Congress’s 
ability to debate rights can point out that Congress does a good job on those 
occasions when it does try;148 the more Congress engages in real discussion 
about Ninth Amendment rights, the better it should get at it.149  A keen 
interest in rights could spur more robust processes for the task, similar to the 
improvement in the quality of budgetary debates with the advent of the 
Congressional Budget Office150 and similar to the positive recent experience 
 
constitutionality”).  In fairness to Roosevelt, his actions did reflect a particular constitutional vision, 
even if he was not interested in stopping to debate that vision in Congress.  See Whittington, supra 
note 12, at 843–44. 
 146.  See supra pp. 83–84. 
 147.  See supra Parts IV.A (discussing distinctions between rights and mere policy) and III.C 
(discussing how such debates might play out in Congress). 
 148.  See Fisher, supra note 12 (offering such a defense); Whittington, supra note 12. 
 149.  Cf. TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 57–62, 129 (discussing possibilities for Congress to do more, 
and improve skill at, constitutional interpretation). 
 150.  See PHILIP G. JOYCE, THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE (2011) (describing history, 
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of the U.K. in considering human rights.151 
Congress is capable of much more than it has delivered to date.  It just 
has to want to do it.  By providing a mechanism for deep principles to be 
treated as something more than mere political points, the Ninth Amendment 
approach could help Congress along toward this goal. 
C.  Does This Actually Protect Rights? 
The final major criticism of having Congress consider Ninth 
Amendment rights is that it would not provide any real protection.  While 
Congress might establish a right, this argument goes, the durability of that 
right will be subject to the whims of shifting majorities in Congress.152  
Aside from the important points in Part III.A on how these rights would 
carry special weight, there are multiple responses to this argument. 
First and foremost, whatever protection Congress can offer is better than 
nothing.  If a particular right is not getting any protection from courts, then 
congressional action can only help.  Even if the right is getting protection 
from courts, congressional action can only help.  In short, unless 
congressional action to recognize a right would somehow actually 
undermine that right, there is really no problem here. 
This connects well with the essence of the Ninth Amendment.  Before 
the Bill of Rights was ratified, there was a pool of rights out in the ether.  
There were various ways to protect those rights—perhaps through judicial 
enforcement, but also through the constitutional structure making it difficult 
to pass legislation, through legislative self-restraint, and through popular 
sovereignty tossing disrespectful congressmen out of office.153  Enumerating 
some rights in the Bill of Rights surely provided enhanced protection for 
those rights; as a practical matter, becoming visible has its advantages.154  
 
function, and success of CBO); TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 16, 197 n.35 (describing Senate process 
for considering constitutional issues); id. at 62 (suggesting benefits of specialized congressional staff 
for analyzing constitutional questions). 
 151.  See David Feldman, The Impact of Human Rights on the UK Legislative Process, 25 
STATUTE L. REV., no. 2, 2004 at 91 (highlighting success of formal rights-protection processes in 
U.K. legislative drafting); Lord Norton of Louth, Parliament and the Courts, in PARLIAMENT IN THE 
21ST CENTURY 310, 316–18 (Nicholas D.J. Baldwin ed., 2005) (describing how, in wake of Human 
Rights Act, U.K. Parliament uses committee staff to analyze human-rights implications of proposed 
legislation). 
 152.  This assumes that Congress does not create any sort of supermajority requirement, as 
discussed at the end of Part IV.A.1. 
 153.  See supra text accompanying notes 39–54.  Mark Graber has detailed numerous examples 
and statements of the original intention that “the democratic principle is the only means of securing 
the rights of the people.”  Graber, supra note 8, at 364–66.  In 1787, obviously, pretty much all of 
the rights of the people were unenumerated ones.  See supra note 52. 
 154.  See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 452 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. James 
Madison) (expressing understanding of enumeration of rights as providing “greater caution” toward 
their protection); see also Rapaczynski, supra note 18, at 182–83 & n.14; Williams, supra note 8, at 
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But, the Ninth Amendment tells us, the Bill of Rights did not eliminate all 
the ways that already existed for protecting unenumerated rights.155  At the 
very least, Ninth Amendment rights are supposed to keep the significant 
legislative protection they enjoyed before the Bill of Rights was ratified. 
Some countries without independent judicial review of legislation, such 
as the U.K., must rely on legislative self-restraint but still have managed to 
achieve a respectable climate of rights.156  Then again, the U.K. has recently 
recognized its own shortfalls in this regard and now allows a sort of judicial 
review of legislation for human-rights violations.157  But this article does not 
suggest that the U.S. rely entirely on Congress and its self-restraint here.  It 
is not as though Congress could invoke the Ninth Amendment to take 
actions that violate other constitutional provisions.  A law that vindicated a 
positive right to public safety could not survive in court, for instance, if it 
violated the Second or Fourth Amendment.  Once again, in the American 
system of separated powers and checks and balances, congressional 
consideration of rights can only add to judicial protection—it cannot 
displace it. 
Even to the extent that congressional protection of rights is limited by 
the way political majorities shift, this is far from fatal.  For one thing, rights 
are vulnerable to such shifts in court too.  One should compare the reality of 
Congress with the reality—not unrealistic ideals—of courts.158  Courts are 
designed to be immune from political pressure, and they do protect rights, 
 
525.  This assertion certainly has raised some hackles, though.  See, e.g., BARNETT, LOST 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 8, at 252 (“The Ninth Amendment mandates that unenumerated rights be 
treated the same as those that are listed.”); MASSEY, supra note 7, at 8, 13 (reaching a similar 
conclusion); Charles L. Black, Jr., On Reading and Using the Ninth Amendment, in POWER AND 
POLICY IN QUEST OF LAW 187, 188 (Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman eds., 1985) (“I 
submit that . . . the Ninth Amendment declares as a matter of law . . . that [unenumerated rights] 
shall be treated as on an equal footing with rights enumerated.”). 
 155.  See supra text accompanying note 53. 
 156.  The comparative experience of slavery in the U.S. versus the U.K. (which abolished slavery 
decades earlier) is a fitting historical example.  See Slavery Abolition Act, 1833, 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 73 
(Eng.) (abolishing slavery in the British Empire in 1833); U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (abolishing 
slavery in the United States in 1865).  This is an appropriate place to mention that Spain and 
Portugal have explicitly created two categories of enumerated rights in their constitutions: one group 
that is judicially enforceable, and another that is not, and instead is only “realized through political 
process.”  OSIATYŃSKI, supra note 119, at 124. 
 157.  See AILEEN KAVANAGH, CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW UNDER THE UK HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 5 
(2009) (describing origins and nature of U.K.’s Human Rights Act); cf. BARNETT, LOST 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 8, at 33 (noting failure of popular sovereignty as first practiced in U.S. 
because of unchecked legislative supremacy). 
 158.  See Whittington, supra note 12, at 847; see also GRIFFIN, supra note 12, at 123 (making this 
point); KRAMER, supra note 11, at 239–40; Fisher, supra note 12, at 725. 
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but they can also be fickle.  Which right is more secure in the U.S. at the 
moment: the (congressionally created) right to receive some sort of old-age 
pension, or the (judicially recognized) First Amendment right of 
corporations to spend unlimited amounts of money on political speech?159  
Courts may delay things, but eventually they almost always fall in line with 
public opinion.160  Indeed, the consensus among political scientists is that the 
Supreme Court is not “eventually” political but is political in the moment.161 
On the flip side, there is less to fear from shifting majorities than we 
might think.  To the extent that narrow majorities do hold sway, 
“majoritarian” is not an antonym for “principled.”162  Political debates are 
not inherently illegitimate just because the side with the most votes wins.163 
More importantly, congressional action is not particularly majoritarian 
anyway.  When it comes to changing the status quo, Congress is designed to 
flout the majority will.164  Because new legislation must win the approval of 
the House, the filibuster-prone Senate, and either the President or a veto-
proof majority, it is incorrect to say that a Ninth Amendment right could be 
established in Congress—or, once established, eliminated—simply by a 
narrow majority, even if it weren’t entitled to special weight.165 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Amendment helps us remember that there is more to rights 
 
 159.  See Young, supra note 14, at 427 (“Even constitutional change through the Article V 
gauntlet may, in some circumstances, be politically easier than eliminating or revising a 
longstanding statutory scheme backed by powerful constituencies.”).  Young uses flag-burning as his 
example instead of the controversial 5–4 decision in Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 50 (2010), but 
the point is the same. 
 160.  See TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 134 (“[T]he Supreme Court rarely holds out for an extended 
period against a sustained national political majority.”); Whittington, supra note 12, at 831 
(questioning the notion that Supreme Court is countermajoritarian).  See generally BARRY 
FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME 
COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009). 
 161.  See Whittington, supra note 12, at 816 (noting how political-science attitudinal model 
“call[s] into question the assumption that judges are uniquely principled or thoughtful in reaching 
their decisions”).  See generally JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT 
AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002) (providing comprehensive description and 
defense of the political-science model of Supreme Court decision making as driven by justices’ 
political preferences, and by extension, by their appointers’ political preferences). 
 162.  See Whittington, supra note 12, at 845; see also id. at 818–26 (defending ability of political 
actors to be principled). 
 163.  Conversely, courts have the ability to buck the majority, and they often do, but that does not 
mean that they necessarily reach the correct result every time.  Cf. id. at 840 (“The success of the 
Constitution is best measured not by how many times political actors are prevented from acting on 
their policy views, but by how often their policy views are consistent with constitutional 
principles.”). 
 164.  See Vermeule, supra note 109. 
 165.  See id. 
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than what courts say about them, or even than what the Constitution says 
about them.  The more that Congress elevates its discussion about the proper 
bounds of individual liberty and government duties, and the less that those 
things are left to the sole discretion of courts, the better off America is. 
This article has tried to make those points modestly, in the hopes of 
spurring further discussion and research.  There are many angles to pursue; 
each contestable point in this article—and surely there are many—represents 
an opportunity to develop or refine the great promise that the Ninth 
Amendment holds in Congress. 
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